

**THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK:
AN UPDATE**

The Congress of the United States
Congressional Budget Office

NOTES

Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in this report are calendar years.

Unemployment rates throughout the report are calculated on the basis of the civilian labor force.

Details in the text and tables of this report may not add to totals because of rounding.

Figures showing periods of recession (indicated by a shaded area) reflect the peak (P) and trough (T) of the recession.

The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) is also referred to in this volume more briefly as the Balanced Budget Act.

PREFACE

This volume is one of a series of reports on the state of the economy and the budget issued periodically by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Chapter III constitutes the report required by Section 2905(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-369). In accordance with CBO's mandate to provide objective analysis, the report contains no recommendations.

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SUMMARY

Moderate economic growth--spurred mainly by an improvement in foreign trade--is likely to continue, according to the latest Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections. But the growth rate is slightly lower than previously projected. Also, the outlook now shows higher consumer price inflation and interest rates than were foreseen in the winter. This change in economic assumptions has increased the projected budget deficits for 1988 through 1992.

THE BUDGET SITUATION

While CBO's winter baseline deficit projection declined steadily from \$176 billion in 1987 to \$84 billion in 1992, the new estimates show a different pattern. Because of unexpectedly strong growth in revenues, the 1987 deficit is now estimated at \$157 billion. But the improvement does not persist. The baseline deficit, which assumes a continuation of current budgetary policies, rises to \$183 billion in 1988 and \$192 billion in 1989 before beginning a slow decline.

This pattern is caused largely by the phase-in of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and by various one-time outlay reductions, as shown in Summary Table 1 and Summary Figure 1. Tax reform has added about \$20 billion to revenues in 1987, but will reduce revenues by \$12 billion in 1988 and \$18 billion in 1989. Asset sales, loan prepayments, the one-day delay of the military pay date, and other one-time outlay savings reduce the deficit by \$15 billion in 1987 but add to the deficit thereafter. Removing these two items yields an adjusted deficit that averages about \$170 billion over the next four years. These adjusted deficits decline relative to GNP--from 4.4 percent of GNP in 1987 to 2.5 percent in 1992--but at a slower rate than in the earlier projections.

Summary Table 2 details the changes in the baseline budget projections since CBO's February report. The most significant changes stem from revisions in the economic projections, which are summarized in the next section. Enacted legislation, primarily the supplemental appropriation, has

raised 1987 budget authority and outlays. Because the baseline assumes that appropriations are held constant in real terms, the supplemental appropriation is projected to increase spending in later years as well. Technical reestimates resulting primarily from new data on taxable incomes have raised revenues, while reestimates for farm price supports, deposit insurance, and Social Security benefits have reduced outlays. The new estimates do not include the new thrift savings fund for federal employees in the budget totals, following the recent General Accounting Office opinion about its proper budgetary treatment. As a result, the thrift fund's receipt of voluntary employee contributions is no longer treated as reducing the deficit, and agency contributions add to the deficit.

SUMMARY TABLE 1. EFFECT OF TAX REFORM AND ONE-TIME
OUTLAY SAVINGS ON THE DEFICIT
(By fiscal year)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
In Billions of Dollars						
Baseline Deficit	157	183	192	176	165	151
Adjustment for:						
Tax reform	20	-12	-18	-5	2	4
One-time outlay savings <u>a/</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>-2</u>	<u>-2</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>-1</u>
Total adjustments	35	-14	-20	-6	1	3
Adjusted Deficit	192	169	172	170	166	154
As a Percent of GNP						
Baseline Deficit	3.6	3.9	3.8	3.3	2.9	2.5
Adjusted Deficit	4.4	3.6	3.4	3.2	2.9	2.5

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.


a. Includes asset sales, loan prepayments, Outer Continental Shelf escrow releases, military pay delay, Medicare payment delay, and advance of final revenue-sharing payment.

Implementing the policies of the Congressional budget resolution would reduce the deficit by \$37 billion in 1988, \$52 billion in 1989, and \$68 billion in 1990 compared with the CBO baseline (see Summary Table 3). About one-half of the deficit reduction is to come from tax increases. Another 20 percent would result from holding the growth in defense spending below the rate of inflation. Defense outlays would be \$2 billion below the baseline in 1988, \$12 billion lower in 1989, and \$19 billion lower in 1990. The resolution allows even less defense spending if the assumed tax increases are not signed into law.

Of the 1988 savings, \$5 billion would result from allowing rural electric cooperatives to prepay to the Treasury without penalty loans that were made to them at the higher interest rates prevailing in the early 1980s. While the transaction would cost the federal government money over the long run, the loan prepayments are treated as reducing the deficit in the year in which the Treasury receives them.

Summary Figure 1.

Deficit Adjusted for Tax Reform Act and One-Time Savings



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS

The major differences between the revised economic projections and those in CBO's winter report are higher inflation for 1987 and 1988 and higher interest rates and lower economic growth over the 1987-1992 period. Consumer price inflation is higher for two reasons: oil prices rebounded sharply on world markets during the first half of the year, and the dollar fell precipitously against the currencies of most of the major U.S. trading partners. In response to threatened inflation and some tightening by the Federal Reserve, both long- and short-term interest rates ratcheted upward. By mid-year, interest rates on 10-year Treasury bonds had increased more than a percentage point; rates on short-term bills also rose, but to a lesser extent.

SUMMARY TABLE 2. CHANGES IN BASELINE DEFICIT PROJECTIONS SINCE FEBRUARY
(By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Winter Baseline	176	171	164	137	110	84
Changes						
Enacted legislation	3	2	2	2	2	2
Economic reestimates	6	23	35	49	64	77
Technical reestimates	-28	-16	-13	-16	-15	-16
Thrift Fund accounting	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	-18	12	27	39	55	67
Summer Baseline	157	183	192	176	165	151

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

The Forecast for 1987 and 1988

Further escalation in inflation is not anticipated. Some increase was bound to occur from the temporarily low inflation rate in 1986; energy and farm commodity prices could not continue falling forever. Barring an interruption of Persian Gulf oil, however, oil supplies appear fundamentally to be adequate. The CBO forecast therefore assumes only a gradual increase in

SUMMARY TABLE 3. POLICY CHANGES IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1988
BUDGET RESOLUTION AS ESTIMATED BY CBO
(By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)

	1988	1989	1990
CBO Baseline Deficit	183	192	176
Policy Changes			
Revenue increases <u>a/</u>	-21	-25	-26
National defense	-2	-12	-19
Nondefense discretionary spending	-4	-6	-8
Entitlements	-3	-5	-7
Offsetting receipts	-1	<u>b/</u>	1
Rural Electrification			
Administration prepayments	-5	1	1
Debt service savings	<u>-1</u>	<u>-5</u>	<u>-9</u>
Total	-37	-52	-68
Budget Resolution Deficit as Estimated by CBO	146	140	108

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

- a. Revenue increases appear as negative numbers because they reduce the deficit.
- b. Less than \$500 million.

the price of imported oil from about \$18.00 per barrel in mid-1987 to about \$20.00 per barrel by the end of 1988. Food prices are assumed to rise by about $4\frac{1}{2}$ percent in both 1987 and 1988. In view of the continuing rapid build-up of U.S. debt to foreigners, CBO and most private forecasters expect that downward pressure on the dollar will continue. The forecast assumes that the exchange rate will be about 5 percent lower at the end of 1988 than it is now. All these factors will continue to raise the cost of imported goods and other consumer purchases through the end of 1988. Because of the current amount of slack in the economy, however, they should not touch off a price-wage explosion, such as happened in the 1970s.

The Federal Reserve will nonetheless continue to be concerned that these temporary price increases not become the basis for a renewed inflationary spiral. As a result, the Federal Reserve will try to prevent further sharp depreciations of the dollar and maintain the differential between interest rates in the United States and interest rates abroad. Reflecting a more inflationary environment and a more stringent policy stance by the Federal Reserve, the CBO forecast shows interest rates to be somewhat higher than previously forecast, particularly in 1988.

The short-run forecast for 1987 and 1988 is shown in Summary Table 4. The forecast assumes that the Congressional budget resolution will be fully implemented and that therefore the federal deficit will shrink. Real GNP is expected to grow moderately--by 3.1 percent in 1987 and 2.6 percent in 1988 (fourth quarter to fourth quarter). The growth forecast for 1987 is virtually unchanged from the winter, but the figure for 1988 has been lowered slightly in view of the worsened outlook for inflation and interest rates. The higher inflation will slow the growth in real disposable personal income and consumption, while higher interest rates will dampen investment, especially in residential construction. With domestic demand sluggish, an improvement in the trade balance--fueled by the continuing decline in the dollar--must provide the major impetus to growth.

Economic Projections for 1989-1992

The medium-term economic projections are presented in Summary Figure 2 and Summary Table 5. Beyond 1988 these economic assumptions are projections rather than forecasts in that they are based on historical trends. They are simply used to show the budgetary outlook under this average historical experience.

Real GNP is assumed to grow at an average annual rate of about 2.7 percent during the 1989-1992 period--slightly lower than previously projected. The civilian unemployment rate edges down from 6.1 percent in 1988 to 5.7 percent in 1992. Inflation eases somewhat after 1988. The rate of increase in the CPI-W falls by almost a percentage point by 1992. Reflecting the unwinding of inflation, interest rates also drop. By the end of the period, the three-month Treasury bill rate averages 5.7 percent, and the 10-year government bond rate 6.8 percent.

Uncertainties in the Forecast

A number of factors make the forecast uncertain. In the short term, the future paths of consumption, net exports, import prices, and inflation are particularly difficult to predict. In the long run, interest rates and produc-

SUMMARY TABLE 4. THE CBO FORECAST FOR 1987 AND 1988

	Actual		Forecast	
	1985	1986	1987	1988
Fourth Quarter to Fourth Quarter (percent change)				
Nominal GNP	6.6	4.5	7.2	6.8
Real GNP	3.3	2.2	3.1	2.6
Implicit GNP Deflator	3.2	2.2	4.0	4.2
CPI-W <u>a</u> /	3.3	0.9	5.1	5.2
Calendar-Year Averages (percent)				
Unemployment Rate	7.2	7.0	6.3	6.1
Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate	7.5	6.0	5.9	6.6
Ten-Year Government Bond Rate	10.6	7.7	8.1	8.5


SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

a. Consumer Price Index for urban wage earners and clerical workers.

tivity are particularly important; minor variations in either variable can change the budget projections significantly.

These and other uncertainties imply that actual budget deficits typically will differ from the forecasts. Indeed, over the 1980s actual deficits have been significantly larger than those forecast at the time of the first Congressional budget resolution--in part because of policy changes, in part because of estimation biases and uncertainties. The last chapter of this report provides a special analysis of these errors.

Summary Figure 2.
Major Economic Assumptions



SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Board.

^aConsumer Price Index for all urban wage and clerical workers.

SUMMARY TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF CBO WINTER AND SUMMER ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS (By calendar year)

	Actual 1986	Forecast 1987 1988	Projected 1989 1990 1991 1992			
Nominal GNP Growth (percent change)						
Summer	5.6	5.9	6.9	6.7	6.8	6.8
Winter	5.4	6.0	6.9	7.2	7.4	7.0
Implicit GNP Deflator (percent change)						
Summer	2.6	3.3	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0
Winter	2.8	3.2	3.8	4.1	4.2	4.2
Real GNP Growth (percent change)						
Summer	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.7
Winter	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.1	2.7
CPI-W (percent change) a/						
Summer	1.6	3.8	5.2	4.8	4.4	4.4
Winter	1.6	3.5	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Unemployment Rate (percent)						
Summer	7.0	6.3	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.8
Winter	7.0	6.6	6.5	6.3	6.1	6.0
Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate (percent)						
Summer	6.0	5.9	6.6	5.8	5.7	5.7
Winter	6.0	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.3
Ten-Year Government Bond Rate (percent)						
Summer	7.7	8.1	8.5	7.8	7.4	7.1
Winter	7.7	7.2	7.2	6.6	6.2	5.9

SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

a. Consumer Price Index for urban wage earners and clerical workers.

CHAPTER I

THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

The pace of economic activity picked up in the first half of 1987, but it is unlikely that this rate of growth will continue in the near term. Output and employment grew at a faster rate than in 1986, and the unemployment rate decreased substantially, falling to its lowest level since 1979. Though the real foreign trade balance has improved, and should continue to be a strong source of growth, most other components of demand are weakening. In contrast to last year, when falling interest rates and inflation were stimulating the economy at the same time as the growing trade deficit was restraining growth, interest rates and inflation are now likely to be dampening factors while the improvement in net exports is likely to be the strongest source of growth. In addition, the continued effort to reduce the federal budget deficit will tend to restrain growth in government outlays.

Only moderate growth and almost no change in the unemployment rate are forecast for the next 18 months. Inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is expected to increase from its low 1986 rate, because of the increase in petroleum prices and an acceleration in import prices.

The midsummer outlook differs from that in the January report in forecasting higher inflation and interest rates in the near term, and slightly lower real economic growth throughout the 1988-1992 period. The primary reasons for the upward revision in consumer price inflation are the fall in the dollar early this year, which was larger than anticipated, and the recent increase in oil prices. The revision in interest rates largely reflects the increase that has already taken place. Some additional upward revision results from higher current and expected inflation and from the Federal Reserve Board's announced intention to counter further sharp declines in the dollar.

The reduction in the real GNP growth forecast for 1988 reflects higher interest rates and the adverse effect of higher inflation on household real incomes. The marginal reduction in the growth assumptions after 1988 arises from a reappraisal of the long-run growth prospects of the economy.